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Mark Sagoff-
"There are no birds in last year's nest,"1 wrote Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow, but this statement scarcely applies to political philosophy. A
century ago, idealists such as F.H. Bradley, T.H. Green, and Bernard
Bosanquet found the nest of liberalism, as we find it today, filled with
political theories of two kinds, utilitarian and Kantian. The idealists criti-
cized them both for assuming that the good consisted simply in collective
utility, pleasure, or the satisfaction of desire. If liberalism is to succeed as
a political theory, the idealists argued, it must recognize a fuller, richer,
and more intersubjective conception of the good.
In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,2 Michael Sandel offers a simi-
larly persuasive criticism of contemporary utilitarian and Kantian concep-
tions of the good: "If the good is nothing more than the indiscriminate
satisfaction of arbitrarily-given preferences, regardless of worth, it is not
difficult to imagine that the right . . . must outweigh it." 3 The kind of
liberalism that conceives of the good as the granular competition of indi-
viduals pursuing their personal desires must fail as an account of our
moral personalities, our communitarian aspirations, and our public lives.
Sandel's criticism-like the idealists'-extends only to liberalism that
defines the good as the satisfaction of personal preference, inclination, or
desire. Sandel demonstrates that liberalism must offer a fuller, richer con-
ception of the good if it is to account for the goals and values that individ-
uals conceive of and pursue in community with others-values they know
together and cannot know alone.
Yet a liberal in the Kantian tradition may reply that he or she need not
offer a full account of the good; for such a person, liberalism may present
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a pragmatic thesis about how social cooperation may be achieved among
individuals and among communities, each having its own discrete concep-
tion of the good. Liberalism, in this view, need not attempt to account for
our moral personalities, our communitarian aspirations, or our public
lives. Instead, liberalism is essentially a theory of justice within the state
and thus addresses justice for communities as well as justice for
individuals.
In the first part of this Review, I describe the traditional idealist cri-
tique of liberalism. I then discuss how Sandel employs its criticisms
against contemporary liberalism, concentrating on John Rawls' political
philosophy. Finally, I discuss liberalism's relationship to our emerging
understanding of what communities are and how they can reach beyond
our interests and sentiments to engage our identity itself.
I. The Idealist Critique of Liberalism
As philosophical terms, "rightness" pertains to voluntary actions, while
"goodness" pertains to the consequences of those actions. A utilitarian
evaluates actions in terms of the goodness of their consequences; in other
words, for the utilitarian, "right" actions are those that lead to "good"
consequences. Although "goodness" can be defined in relation to any
ideal, utilitarians usually follow Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
and define the good in terms of pleasure, happiness, or the satisfaction of
desire.4 For a utilitarian, then, right actions maximize happiness, or they
follow from rules that, if consistently applied, maximize utility in the long
run.
5
The Kantian or deontological liberal does not necessarily insist on a
different conception of the good; like the utilitarian, he may also reduce
goodness to pleasure or preference.' The Kantian, however, insists on
both the moral and the conceptual primacy of the right. We have a moral
duty to keep promises whether or not this maximizes happiness. And our
concept of the right must precede our concept of the good because right-
ness is intrinsic to actions, not derived from their consequences.
Among the objections to utilitarianism that the idealists raised, the most
4. For a summary of the early development of utilitarian moral theory, see H. SIDOWICK, THE
METHODS OF ETHICS 411-95 (7th ed. 1907).
5. For an account of rule utilitarianism and its analysis of justice in relation to distribution
problems, see D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 164-77 (1965).
6. Kant himself, however, thought happiness too indeterminate to provide a criterion for legisla-
tion. See I. KANT, Theory and Practice Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in
Theory But Does Not Apply to Practice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 412, 423 (C. Friedrich ed.
1949) ("[N]o generally valid principle can be offered for legislation [based on happiness]. For the
conditions of the time as well as the very conflicting and constantly changing illusions as to what
constitutes happiness-and no one can prescribe for anyone wherein he should seek happi-
ness-render impossible all fixed principles . . ").
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telling is that utilitarianism fails to offer a credible conception of the self.
The utilitarian views the self as a bundle of wants or preferences, a series
of pleasures and pains, or a collection of psychic states. What holds this
bundle together? What separates one collection from the next? According
to an idealist like F.H. Bradley, the moral self "is for us a whole, .. not
a mere collection of states."
'7
What makes this attack on utilitarianism particularly powerful is how
the idealists turn it against the "opposite pole," that is, against the Kant-
ian conception of a moral agent as a wholly generalized being, a "pure
will" doing its duty "for duty's sake."" Bradley contends that the Kantian
formula, like the utilitarian, ignores the nature of actual persons. It does
this not by dissolving the person into a set of interests, but by abstracting
him or her from his or her interests. The utilitarian ignores the distinc-
tiveness of individuals, and ignores the boundaries separating persons; in-
stead, the utilitarian treats all pleasures and preferences as if they be-
longed to a single social aggregate. In contrast, the Kantian defines the
person by looking only at the boundaries, and considers only universal
ethical principles; the Kantian gives the individual only a formal identity
devoid of particular content.
According to T.H. Green, Kant's error lay in his belief that the individ-
ual must act either upon desire or upon a universal moral principle.10
Idealists believe instead that a person identifies and realizes himself not by
satisfying every passing desire or by acting from a universal, abstract
moral law, but by forming and pursuing long-term plans that have mean-
ing and value within a cultural community and can therefore be viewed as
achievements.
That the idealists emphasize the particular over the abstract or univer-
sal, and that they insist on the obligations of actual social union, rather
than those of hypothetical social contract, does not imply that they are
committed to relativism. Bradley, for example, argues that a person "can
not take his morality simply from the moral world he is in. . ."' That
7. F. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 68 (2d ed. 1927). "We have learnt," Bradley writes, "that the
self to be realized is not the self as this or that feeling, or as any series of the particular feelings of our
own or others' streams or trains of consciousness. It is, in short, not the self to be pleased." Id. at 160.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. T.H. GREEN, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant: The Metaphysic of Ethics-The Good
Will, in 2 WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN § 119, at 139 (1886) ("It is not true, as Kant seems to
hold, that human motives are reducible either for desire for pleasure on the one side (in which case
the will is 'heteronomous'), or desire for fulfilment of the moral law on the other (in which case alone,
according to him, it is 'autonomous').. . . His error lies in supposing that there is no alternative
between the determination of desire by anticipation of pleasure and its determination by the concep-
tion of a moral law.").
11. F. BRADLEY, supra note 7, at 204. Bradley asserts that moral progress must be achieved by
historical, evolutionary means, rather than by philosophical means. See id. at 190.
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world, being part of history, will contain contradictions. A person, there-
fore, "must thus stand before and above inconsistencies, and reflect upon
them."'  The individual must be self-critical and must maintain what
Bradley calls a "cosmopolitan morality"" in his or her loyalties, projects,
and plans.
A cosmopolitan moral perspective, however, depends upon critical judg-
ment, ethical intuition, and human sympathy, rather than upon a system
of philosophical abstractions, such as the one deontological liberalism pro-
vides. We can rely to some extent on a general sense of moral progress:
We "know to some extent what is thought right or wrong in other com-
munities now, and what has been thought at other times; and this leads to
a notion of goodness not of any particular time and country."1 4 Grounding
the good in a historical and cultural perspective can save us from both
Kantian over-abstraction and utilitarian reductionism. Developing a cos-
mopolitan conception of the good can make political theory relevant to
political life and avoid the emptiness of Kantian and utilitarian theories of
justice.
The idealist influence today-as we are about to see-lies in the idea
that society is not a collection of pre-defined, pre-motivated individuals,
but instead "an organism in which I am a member, and in whose life I
live . . . .,,5 The self has a moral identity only within the political and
social world it inhabits. It has no pre-political goals or natural rights on
which to build a universal, atemporal structure of political institutions.1 "
We develop our identities in communities-some intimate and familiar,
others professional, cultural, or political-within which we share aspira-
tions and a sense of the meaning or the fitness of things. Accordingly,
idealists reject the idea of a pre-political social contract and with it the
methodological individualism that they find in both utilitarian and deonto-
logical theories of the state.
II. Sandel's Use of the Idealist Critique
Utilitarian liberals-contemporary welfare economists come to
mind 1 7-define the good as the satisfaction of preferences, wants, or
desires. The utilitarian erects a structure of rights upon a set of rules that
maximizes the satisfaction of these preferences, taken as an aggregate,
12. Id. at 204.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 204-05.
15. Id. at 116.
16. See T.H. GREEN, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: The Grounds of Political
Obligation, in 2 WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN, supra note 10, § 22, at 347-48.
17. See, e.g., J. HARSANYI, ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
(1976); Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970).
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over the long run." The deontologist, as Sandel suggests, disagrees not so
much with this conception of the good, but rather with the attempt to base
a theory of rights upon it. For the deontological liberal, the satisfaction of
desires has value only if those desires reflect an individual's freedom and
autonomy. Thus, a theory of rights or of justice must precede an analysis
of utility, efficiency, or the satisfaction of desires.
Sandel points to the appearance of this thesis in the works of many
liberal philosophers. Charles Fried, for example, thinks that-concepts of
right and wrong override concepts of the good "because they establish our
basic position as freely choosing entities."' 9 The norms of right and
wrong, Fried argues, express the value of persons and thus "are absolute
in respect to the various ends we choose to pursue. '20 John Rawls argues
that desires that violate the conditions of freedom and autonomy-desires
that violate justice-have no value. "Having no merit in the first place,
they cannot override its claims."' 2' Accordingly, Rawls contends:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. . . . Therefore in
a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled;
the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or
to the calculus of social interests.22
Against this thesis of Rawls and deontological liberalism generally,
Sandel directs the same attack that Green and Bradley direct against
Kant-though Sandel, curiously, never mentions Green, Bradley, or any
of the idealists.23 Sandel. employs the idealist solution to the dilemma that
both Kant and Rawls have posed. Kant and Rawls argue that the will
must be constituted prior to its ends or be dissolved in them. Sandel re-
sponds that the self may constitute and realize itself. It may determine its
18. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudi-
cation, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
19. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 8-9 (1978).
20. Id. at 29. For similar expressions of this idea, see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 48-49 (1980); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30-33 (1974); Dworkin,
Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIvATE MORALITY 113, 135-36 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
21. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31 (1971).
22. Id. at 3-4.
23. Green charged Kant with supposing mistakenly that the will must be determined either by a
universal conception of morality (a conception of right), in which case the will is autonomous, or by
an arbitrary, heteronomous desire (a conception of the good), in which case it is enslaved. See supra
note 10. Green and Bradley agreed with Kant that if we assume that the good consists in the psychic
states of individuals-their pleasures, the satisfaction of their inclinations-then we will not be able to
explain the identity of a person or the boundaries that separate one individual from another. They
argue against Kant that individuals may find in the aspirations they share in communities, in the
ideals and loyalties they do not choose so much as recognize as theirs, a much more powerful concep-
tion of the good, capable of explaining the unity and commonality of persons as well as their separate-
ness and plurality.
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own unity through life-long plans and projects that are neither private nor
arbitrary, schemes that are appreciated and respected within the culture
and the aspirations of the communities to which individuals belong.24
These values give individuals identity and character; they reflect what
they are, not just what they want.
Although Sandel and the idealists are certainly correct when they claim
that the self in community with others has an identity that reflects more
than its own personal interests or desires, it is unclear how this insight of
moral psychology provides the basis for a political theory. Sandel believes
that Rawls and other Kantian liberals believe that conceptions of right
compete with conceptions of good in constituting the identity of the indi-
vidual. Thus, if Rawls really intends to erect a system of justice on an
individualistic foundation, then Sandel is plainly right in questioning the
belief that justice is more important than a fuller, richer conception of the
good. Yet a deontological liberal like Rawls could surely argue that politi-
cal institutions must have the virtue of justice to arbitrate among conflict-
ing conceptions of the good, however rich, however full. The priority of
the right may thus be defended in political theory without being derived
from a deeper truth of moral philosophy.
III. The Development of the Just and the Good
Sandel observes an important common theme in deontological liberalism
from Kant to Rawls, namely, that the self is constituted or identified prior
to its ends. Kant provided a metaphysical argument: He observed that all
of our psychological states, whatever their content, exist in time, and form
a series or stream of consciousness, the unity of which requires a substrate
or ground. Kant denied that a person can discover this ground by intro-
spection; it must be presupposed.25 Rawls agrees that the self must be
constituted prior to its interests or ends, but recognizes that the Kantian
will, behind its veil of appearances, is too disembodied, formal, and empty
to produce determinate principles of justice or legislation applicable to ac-
tual people in the actual world.2 6 Thus, Rawls introduces the concept of
the original position; there, ignorant of the circumstances that separate
them, parties agree on principles of justice. The description of the original
position provides a non-transcendental way of separating the self from its
24. See B. WILLIAMS, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PA-
PERS, 1973-1980, at 1, 5-19 (1981) (criticizing Kant and Rawls for being insufficiently concerned
with individual "character," that is, an individual's concerns and projects).
25. "Yet beyond this character of himself as a subject made up, as it is, of mere appearances he
must suppose there to be something else which is its ground-namely, his Ego as this may be consti-
tuted in itself .... I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 119 (H. Paton trans.
1956).
26. Rawls, The Basic Structure As Subject, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159, 165 (1977).
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ends and thus of asserting the primacy of the agent over the interests or
goals he or she may pursue. In this way, Rawls hopes to have deontologi-
cal liberalism without "metaphysical embarrassment."2
Is the original position an appropriate way of thinking about justice?
Are the principles chosen there just? Rawls gives two reasons to believe
that the principles chosen by free and equal individuals behind the veil of
ignorance should be considered superior to the goals they pursue, individ-
ually or collectively, in their natural lives." The first involves what Rawls
calls a "reflective equilibrium" among our considered judgments and
shared intuitions.2" The second, which Sandel examines in a later chapter,
appeals to the tradition of the social contract and thus "connects the the-
ory of justice with the theory of rational choice." 30
A. The Reflective Equilibrium
Sandel argues that not all the conditions embodied in the original posi-
tion conform to our shared assumptions. In particular, Sandel questions
the idea that no quality or goal can be constitutive of the self, in other
words, that the self possesses its interests, aims, goals, and other attributes
detached from the experiences it happens to "have." Sandel contends that
we do not in fact conceive of ourselves as "antecedently individuated sub-
ject[s]" whose bounds are fixed prior to our particular beliefs and exper-
iences.3 1 On the contrary, we find or identify ourselves in our relationship
to the objects and ideas we encounter and to which we attach meaning.
Sandel denies, then, that we can assume, without begging important ques-
tions, subjects whose identities are prior to the things they have, indepen-
dent of all their interests, ends, and relations with others.
Sandel argues that the deontological notion of the self precludes any
conception of the good that goes to what a person is, not just what he or
she wants or has:
2
It rules out the possibility of any attachment (or obsession) able to
reach beyond our values and sentiments to engage our identity itself.
It rules out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill,
the identity as well as the interests of the participants could be at
stake. And it rules out the possibility that common purposes and
27. P. 14.
28. See Lyons, Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments, in READING
RAWLS 141 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
29. J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 20, 48.
30. Id. at 17.
31. P. 55.
32. For the deontologist, the self may come to know itself, then, not as a being that chooses its
ends but as one that recognizes or discovers them, and its fundamental preference (as the ancient
philosophers thought) may be for conditions that enhance knowledge rather than choice. P. 22.
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ends could inspire more or less expansive self-understandings and so
define community in the constitutive sense, a community describing
the subject and not just the objects of shared aspirations. More gen-
erally, Rawls' account rules out the possibility of what we might call
"intersubjective" or "intrasubjective" forms of self-understanding,
ways of conceiving the subject that do not assume its bounds to be
given in advance."3
Rawls' original position could be construed, however, as a fairly intui-
tive, almost commonsensical, tool for securing social cooperation and polit-
ical harmony among people who might not agree on any conception or
theory of the good. In this reading, the "veil of ignorance" does not per-
form the metaphysical function of dividing the essence of personhood from
its coincidental or contingent qualities. Rather, it performs the heuristic
function of suggesting how citizens might structure basic social institutions
through which, as free and equal persons, they may then choose their own
communities and pursue their own lives.
B. The Idea of Individual Desert
You may have a fuller sense of the richness and subtlety of Sandel's
argument when you learn that so far this Review has covered, and sketch-
ily at that, only the introduction and the first of four chapters of his dense,
crowded book. Sandel later criticizes Rawls' conception of contract in the
original position. First, he examines Rawls' denial of the concept of indi-
vidual desert. Rawls claims that "no one deserves his place in the distribu-
tion of native endowments, any more than one deserves one's initial start-
ing place in society."'34 The idea that a person deserves the rewards
brought by his hard work or good character is equally problematic, "for
his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social cir-
cumstances for which he can claim no credit."35
Sandel mobilizes Robert Nozick's well known argument that the differ-
ence principle-which allows only those inequalities that work to the ad-
vantage of its least advantaged members-undercuts deontological liber-
alism's promise to take seriously the plurality and distinctness of
individuals 6 and to assure that these individuals "treat one another not as
means only but as ends in themselves."137 Rawls acknowledges that "the
33. P. 62. The idealists also made this attack on liberal political theory. See B. BOSANQUET, THE
VALUE AND DESTINY OF THE INDMDUAL 46-47 (1913).
34. J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 104.
35. Id. For an idealist account of the apportionment of natural talents, see B. BOSANQUET, supra
note 33, at 144-48.
36. J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 29 (utilitarianism is anti-individualistic because it "conflatles]"
all systems of desires).
37. Id. at 179.
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difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distri-
bution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of
this distribution whatever it turns out to be.""8 Denying that a person's
traits and abilities form a basis for individual desert, regarding these per-
sonal attributes instead as common assets, involves viewing the individual
as merely a means to the ends of others, rather than as an end in himself.
How can Rawls' reconstruction of Kant be adequate if it treats people's
abilities and talents as resources for others? Nozick answers: "Only if one
presses very hard on the distinction between men and their talents, assets,
abilities, and special traits."3 9
We can now see why Sandel takes the reader through this familiar
territory. It is to emphasize, once again, Rawls' sharp distinction of the
self from what it possesses.40 The sharp distinction between the self and
its attributes
has the consequence of leaving us with a subject so shorn of empiri-
cally-identifiable characteristics as to resemble once more the Kant-
ian transcendent or disembodied subject Rawls resolved to avoid. It
makes the individual inviolable only by making him invisible, and
calls into question the dignity and autonomy this liberalism seeks
above all to secure.
4 1
C. Justice and Rational Choice
Having deployed Nozick's arguments to underscore this point, Sandel
asks "why the original position provides an appropriate way of thinking
about justice at all.' 42 He then examines Rawls' second method of justifi-
cation, which connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational
choice.'3
Sandel points out that a contract among "beings struck with the kind of
complicated amnesia necessary to the veil of ignorance" 4 is hypothetical:
It imagines an agreement that never occurred among beings who never
existed. The doubly hypothetical nature of the contract, however, gives it
the power to justify the principles of fairness and consent that underlie the
38. Id. at 101.
39. R. NoziCK, supra note 20, at 228.
40. "[S]trictly speaking, there is nothing that '%,' qua pure subject of possession, have-nothing
that is attached, rather than related, to me-nothing at least in the strong, constitutive sense of posses-
sion necessary to a desert base." P. 95.
41. Id.
42. P. 104.
43. Rawls connects these two ideas by examining "which principles it would be rational to adopt"
given the original position. J. RAWIS, supra note 21, at 17.
44. P. 105.
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legitimacy of ordinary contracts.
To see this, one may ask for the principles that define what may count
as "fair" and as "voluntary" in any transaction. Even libertarians, who
argue that voluntary agreements are self-justifying, appeal to principles of
acceptable bargaining practice to rule out contracts based on coercion and
fraud. What justifies the principles we use to determine whether the con-
tracts we make create legitimate expectations and moral duties? Rawls
appeals to a hypothetical, unambiguously fair situation involving free and
equal agents who rationally agree upon the principles they adopt. The
hypothetical nature of this contract and the parties to it suggest that what
is at stake is not a contract but a contractarian argument of the sort we
have to make if we are to understand how actual contracts bind us. Thus,
the idea of the hypothetical contract in the original position is needed to
justify actual agreements, not the other way around. "Actual contracts
presuppose principles of justice, which derive in turn from a hypothetical
original contract."' 5
While Sandel accepts the structure of Rawls' argument as he has inter-
preted it so far, he criticizes it from another direction. Rawls emphasizes
the participation of a group of people in the choice of principles of justice
in the original position. The principles are supposed to be the result of
deliberation and agreement:
[W]hereas the utilitarian extends to society the principle of choice for
one man, justice as fairness, being a contract view, assumes that the
principles of social choice, and so the principles of justice, are them-
selves the object of an original agreement.
[F]rom the standpoint of contract theory one cannot arrive at a
principle of social choice merely by extending the principle of ra-
tional prudence to the system of desires constructed by the impartial
spectator. To do this is not to take seriously the plurality and dis-
tinctness of individuals . . ..
It is hard, however, to discern distinct individuals behind the veil of
ignorance. To guarantee fairness, Rawls postulates that all parties "are
similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his par-
ticular condition . . . . In that event, we must wonder what there is to
discuss, what room there is for give and take, "since the differences among
the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational
. ... ,, If everyone is convinced by the same argument, then "we can
45. P. 119.
46. J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 28, 29.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id. at 139.
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view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person
selected at random. If anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of
justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be
reached." '49
Sandel argues persuasively that the principles of justice thus are not
chosen in the original position so much as created by it. The individuals
behind the veil do not make an agreement, but rather a discovery that
might as well have been made by any of them. Rawls apparently concedes
this when he makes the oxymoronic argument that acceptance of the prin-
ciples "is the only choice consistent with the full description of the original
position. The argument aims eventually to be strictly deductive."
50
For Sandel, the argument is already strictly deductive; the voluntarism
of Kant has already given way to the cognitivism of Spinoza.51 Why can
self-recognition or self-discovery take place only behind the veil of igno-
rance, only when the mind is separated from every conception of the good
but one-the distribution of primary goods secured by justice? If the self
can recognize itself and find the grounds for its own unity in a fuller
conception of the good, then we have reason to doubt the priority of a
conception of right discovered without it. To recognize this fuller concep-
tion of the good, Sandel, like the idealists, examines the other side of the
plurality and distinctness of individuals-not the claims of separateness
but the claims of community.
IV. The Separation of the Self and Its Attributes and the Community's
Use of the Individual
Sandel uses Ronald Dworkin's defense of affirmative action as an ex-
ample of the extent to which deontological liberals separate the self from
all its traits and then-as if this somehow followed-view those traits as
common assets. What is "the relevant community across which 'my' assets
are properly shared" and how does it establish its credentials?5 2 Rawls (to
redeem the notion of common assets involved in the difference principle)
and Dworkin (to define the relevant community required by his argument
for affirmative action) both presuppose a conception of the common good
that is not contingent but constitutive enough of the individual that "when
'my' assets or life prospects are enlisted in the service of a common en-
deavor, I am likely to experience this less as a case of being used for
others' ends and more as a way of contributing to the purposes of a com-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 121.
51. The eloquent ending of Rawls' book confirms this suspicion. Id. at 587.
52. P. 147.
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munity I regard as my own."53 If Sandel is correct, then the morality of
right, which "corresponds to the bounds of the self and speaks to that
which distinguishes us,"" is not prior to the morality of the good, which
"corresponds to the unity of persons and speaks to that which connects
us,"' but requires it for its coherence and completion.
Sandel runs through Dworkin's familiar argument that no one, black or
white, deserves or has an antecedent right to be admitted to law or medi-
cal school and points out its parallels to Rawls' argument that no talent or
ability belongs so completely to a person that he or she deserves anything
because of its possession.58 Even if we accept this argument against mer-
itocracy and agree that no one on the basis of his character or capacities
has the right, for example, to go to law school, we may nevertheless ask
why society should have any less arbitrary, any better claim on these "as-
sets." Why should we regard them as common resources and dedicate
them to collective ends?"
The problem can be posed in another way. Dworkin, for example, has
argued eloquently that efficiency, preference-satisfaction, or the maximiza-
tion of wealth-the goals typically asserted by contemporary utilitarian-
ism-have no merit or value and therefore cannot trump the claims of
justice or, indeed, any worthy claim."' Why, then, do deontological liber-
als like Dworkin apparently assume that when individual rights are not at
stake, social policy should be decided on utilitarian grounds? Why do they
rely upon a maximizing principle except when rights are involved?
59
Deontological liberalism has an important and convincing reply, one
Sandel thinks it must make. We may frame this reply (although Sandel
does not) in terms of a distinction Dworkin draws in an essay which ap-
peared at about the same time as Sandel's book. 0 Dworkin distinguishes




56. Sandel imagines two hilarious letters in which the Dean of Admissions explains this to an
unsuccessful and then to a successful candidate. The Dean cautions the latter, for example, against
thinking that admission reflects favorably either on his abilities (which are merely traits society needs
for its own purposes) or on his conscientious effort to develop those abilities. The Dean concludes:
[Tihe assumption that you deserve even the superior character necessary to your effort is
equally problematic, for your character also depends on fortunate circumstances of various
kinds for which you can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to your case.
We look forward nonetheless to seeing you in the fall. Sincerely yours .
P. 142.
57. See R. NOZICK, supra note 20, at 228.
58. See Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFsTL4 L. REV. 563 (1980); Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:
A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
59. P. 140.
60. Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 20, 1983, at 47.
61. Id.
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He argues that government ought to be as neutral as possible among con-
ceptions of the good life and the values that enter that life.62 Society is best
governed by neutral principles that secure for free and equal persons the
right to plan their own lives and to pursue the lives they plan.63
While deontological liberalism insists on official neutrality among con-
ceptions of the good life and thus finds the impartiality of markets attrac-
tive, it need not insist upon a similar neutrality among conceptions of the
good society. Liberalism is not neutral as to what a just society is; it pre-
supposes a theory of justice. Similarly, liberalism is not neutral or utilitar-
ian in regard to the curse of racism; it insists that a good society is uncon-
scious of race and will therefore support affirmative action. Liberals favor
progressive prograrris to improve education, the sciences, the arts, and the
quality of the environment; liberals insist that a good society is compas-
sionate, and act to relieve suffering out of sympathy as much as justice.
The goals implicit in liberal social programs are not matters of arbitrary
preference and are not in that sense utilitarian. Liberalism, to be sure,
respects the neutrality of markets on the question of the good life; it need
not take its conception of the good society, however, from markets.
Sandel argues that such a view of liberalism can explain why a person's
traits and abilities are "common assets," by relying upon a "constitutive"
conception of community rather than upon the weaker "sentimental" and
"instrumental" conceptions that involve altruistic fellow-feeling or on a
commitment to mutual aid.6 ' The stronger conception, Sandel argues, in-
volves not just altruism or a scheme of cooperation "but a mode of self-
understanding partly constitutive of the agent's identity."65 Community in
this sense is not something people choose, but something they know or
discover; it is less a matter of voluntary association than of shared under-
standing and recognition. According to Sandel, Rawls' defense of the dif-
ference principle and Dworkin's defense of affirmative action presuppose
a community of sharing in this strong sense-"a wider subject of posses-
sion capable of laying legitimate claim to the assets necessary to its pur-
poses without using some as means to others' ends .... ."6
Sandel turns, finally, to the role of reflection or knowledge, as opposed
to pleasure or preference. He argues that Rawls conceives of the good as
so hopelessly mired in contingency that we can hardly deliberate about
ends, but only means to ends. The choice of ends amounts to little more
than a simple weighing of the intensity of our desires.67 When conceptions





67. Rawls apparently concedes this point: "That we have one conception of the good rather than
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of the good are understood as morally arbitrary, it is hard to see why the
priority of justice is not simply trivial, why justice itself is not trivial, if all
it does is enable us "to pursue these arbitrary conceptions 'as fully as
circumstances permit.' "68
In the final hurried pages of the book, Sandel argues that given the
limited role of reflection in Rawls' view and the arbitrariness of the goals
people seek, "the virtues of benevolence and love, as features of the good,
are forms of sentiment rather than insight, ways of feeling rather than
knowing." ''" Where there is no knowledge of the good, there can be no
shared or final ends that define a community in the constitutive sense, for
what marks such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence,
or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain 'shared
final ends' alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a back-
ground of implicit practices and understandings within which the
opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved.70
Sandel sees the production of this common vocabulary as a "precarious
achievement"71 of politics. A theory of justice that ignores this achieve-
ment overlooks the danger that when politics goes badly, dislocations and
not just disappointments result. "And it forgets the possibility that when




The idealists struck a eudaemonistic attitude: "[N]ow for us (as it was
for Hellas) the main question is: There being some end, what is that
end?" Kant could not answer that question because he divorced the right
completely from the good and the principles of morality from the ends of
history. The idealists argued, moreover, that Kant too hastily assumed
that whatever is not done for duty's sake must be done for pleasure's sake
or on the basis of inclination; thus, they charged him with adopting a
theory of psychological hedonism that alienates us from all but a few of
our actions. Why, then, should we be moral? The idealists worried that
Kant had no better reply than to postulate the existence of God to reward
another is not relevant from a moral standpoint. In acquiring it we are influenced by the same sort of
contingencies that lead us to rule out a knowledge of our sex and class." Rawls, Fairness to Goodness,






73. F. BRADLEY, supra note 7, at 81.
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morality with happiness after death.
Sandel directs the same general criticism against Rawls. But Rawls
may plausibly reply that, unlike Kant, he is concerned only with political
theory, not with broader moral or metaphysical questions.7 If so, Rawls
need not attempt to establish the priority of the right over the good in any
comprehensive sense; rather, he may offer at most practical or intuitive
reasons for designing social institutions in ways that reflect fairness or
justice. Someone convinced of a particular conception of the good-for ex-
ample, happiness-could point out, however, that we do not take happi-
ness seriously unless we allow it to trump justice. Thus, the possibility
arises that the right might not take precedence over the good, even in
political theory, once we have some stronger, comprehensive conception of
the good.
In any event, Sandel argues persuasively (as do the idealists) that Kant-
ians cannot demonstrate the priority of right simply by debunking a no-
tion of the good based on sheer preference or inclination, a conception so
shallow, arbitrary, heteronomous, and mired in contingency that no one
could defend it in the first place. By setting up efficiency, wealth max-
imization, Pareto optimality, or the like as the only competition, deonto-
logical liberals may triumph early, but they must reconcile themselves
with a richer conception of the good, if not in the afterlife, then at the end
of the philosophical day. As we ask Kant why, all things considered, indi-
viduals should be just, so we may ask Rawls why a society, particularly
one dedicated to a utilitarian conception of the good, should be just.
Rawls, unlike Kant, does not promise the just treasures in heaven but he
does rely on "the general facts of economics and psychology" to show that
an equitable society will not be too inefficient.
7 5
The strength of Sandel's book, like the strength of the idealist thesis
generally, is to argue persuasively against the idea of a social contract
dependent on possessive individualism. The contractarian view can mis-
takenly render the state nothing more than a machine for maximizing
individual utilities:
But the state's relation to the individual is quite different from this.
Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members
that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and
an ethical life. Unification pure and simple is the true content and
aim of the individual, and the individual's destiny is the living of a
universal life. 6
74. Rawls has recently replied in a similar way to Sandel and Walzer. See J. Rawls, Political
Philosophy: Political Not Metaphysical (draft manuscript, Nov. 1983) (on file with author).
75. J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 158.
76. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 258, at 156 (T. Knox trans. 1942).
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Nonetheless, Sandel does not show that deontological liberalism as rep-
resented, for example, by Rawls must inevitably commit this error, that it
must always mistake the interests of individuals for the ultimate ends of
the state. On the contrary, Rawls' theory of the good, even if it is instru-
mental, does not necessarily envision the satisfaction of preferences as the
goal of political association; his theory seeks only to create the background
conditions under which free and equal individuals can pursue their own
goals, whatever they may be. The background conditions are the only ba-
sis on which we can plausibly unite as a political community. If any other
conception of the good can unite us, Sandel has not told us what it is.
The weakness of Sandel's impressive and convincing book lies in its
failure to move us beyond Hegel, Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. In par-
ticular, Sandel fails to explain why self-realization must take place within
an individual's station and duties within a community, why an individ-
ual's values, to be more than mere preferences, must be strongly shared,
why they constitute his or her identity only if they are constitutive of the
communities to which he or she belongs. Only by assuming the unity of
the objective good can Sandel hold it up as a clear competitor to the claims
of right. But if the good is many-if there are many communities of shar-
ing-then justice may be needed, ultimately, to arbitrate the conflicting
claims of these communities.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice not only criticizes the deontologi-
cal project, but also calls for its completion. In this way it is not so much a
critique of Rawls as a vindication, for it calls on deontology to comple-
ment the theory of right with a theory of good equal to it and suggests
that this full theory of the good may speak to what unifies people, just as
a conception of right speaks to what separates them. But at this level of
analysis, as John Dewey argued in criticizing Bradley and Green, both
society and the individual dwindle into abstractions, held together and
apart by philosophical theories that do not help them solve the problems
they actually have. Dewey argues that political theory, by abstracting the
self from its various conflicting commitments and identities and by divorc-
ing society from its various highly differentiated agencies and institutions,
leaves unsolved the problem it has tried to address.77 For Dewey, recon-
ciling the disparate energies and powers of society and the divided individ-
ual poses a more genuine problem than reconciling an abstract individual
and an abstract state.
If the course of political theory continues to double back upon itself, as
it has so brilliantly in Sandel's book, we may expect, in the next moment
of this cyclical progress, a renovation of the pragmatic theory of the good.
77. J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 3-36 (1927).
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If the book that revitalizes the arguments of the pragmatists does as well
as Sandel has done in reviving the arguments of the idealists, it too will be
a superb achievement and deserve from its reviewers, as Sandel's book
deserves, the highest praise.
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